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Abstrakt
Tato práce se zaměřuje na návrh a implementaci modulárního programu pro zpracování
XML popisu OTP klíčů používaných především v zařízeních od výrobců Yubico a RSA.
Zaroveň také práce popisuje návrh a implementace modulu pro vložení získaných informací
do adresářového serveru 389DS. Součástí práce je seznámení s OTP, standartem PSKC
a protokolem LDAP. Dále je v práci uveden návrh a implementace obou částí programu.
V závěru práce rozebírá možnosti dalšího vývoje aplikace.
Abstract
The focus of this thesis is the design and implementation of a modular application for
parsing XML descriptions of OTP keys used mainly by hardware solutions of RSA and
Yubico. The thesis also describes the design and implementation of a module used to
upload the parsed information onto a 389DS directory server. This thesis acquaints the
reader with the basics of one time passwords, the PSKC standard and the LDAP protocol.
Finally this thesis analyzes the possibilities of future development of the application.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Nowadays, with the increase in online activities and the domination of cloud computing
paradigm there is a need for a more secure authentication solution and that solution proved
to be multi-factor authentication. However, most multi-factor authentication systems are
based on one-time-passwords generated by wide variety of cryptographic tokens and a
standardized approach to key data provisioning and transport is therefore required for the
system to be effective.
As there is a lack of such provisioning and trasport solutions, this thesis aims to plug
the hole by designing and developing a simple and easy to use modular application that
would be able to transform information about one-time-passwods found in a standardized
XML document into a format more suitable for the chosen authentication system. Using
the highly-modular aspect of the application the transformation can be achieved entirely
independently of the XML-parsing back-end and the code for a specific output format can
be contained in a single plugin module.
During the authentication procedure of a user, the authorization server does more read-
ing than writing to the data storage, hence a read-oriented 389DS directory server storage
solution, which is used in the FreeIPA project, has been selected as the output format for
the application’s plugin and the design and implementation of said plugin is also an integral
part of this thesis.
This thesis can be divided into several chapters. The first one is the Introduction while
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to one time passwords and security tokens based on
them. The input XML document for the application is defined by the PSKC standard and
so Chapter 3 focuses on explaining the structure and semantics of a PSKC document. As
a design and implementation of an LDAP plugin for the back-end parsing application is a
part of this thesis chapter 4 offers a brief introduction into the LDAP protocol. Chapter 5
contains the design of the parser and the module protocol. Chapter 6 then follows up with
details about the implementation and development in general. Finally Chapter 7 contains
the conclusion of my work as well as information on possibilities of future development.
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Chapter 2
One-time-passwords and their
usage
This chapter provides basic information about OTPs and their use in hardware tokens.
One-time-passwords (OTP) are passwords that are valid only once, with some only
during a small time frame, and have been designed to be a solution to the many problems
of static passwords (eg. replay attacks, memorization). When authenticating, both the
user and the authentication server have to generate the same OTP in order for the user’s
request to be accepted. If the user (or an attacker) tries to use the OTP again the server
will generate a different password and the user’s request will be denied. They are however
prone to man-in-the-middle attacks and so are often encrypted by the use of symmetric key
cryptography.
The main approaches for the generation of OTPs are:
 Based on generating the new password from a previously generated password using a
mathematical function – hash-based OTPs. These OTPs are generated on-demand,
usually using a button press on the device.
 OTPs are valid only during a time frame of a specific length – time-based OTPs. The
client and server have to be synchronized.
 Based on a counter that is a part of the OTP – counter-based OTPs.
 Based on a algorithm that generates the password from a challenge send by the server
– challenge-response OTPs. Challenge-response OTPs are not a focus of this thesis.
One-time-passwords are mostly used in multi-factor authentication where the user has
to provide two or three authentication factors about himself (something he knows, some-
thing he has, something he is).
As the algorithms behind OTPs are often too difficult for the typical user to compute
by himself, the passwords have to be generated by either software or hardware solutions
called security (or cryptography) tokens.
2.1 Hardware vs. Software Solutions
There are two groups of security token solutions – hardware and software.
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2.1.1 Hardware Tokens
Hardware OTP tokens are portable cryptographic devices that can be used by the user
to generate OTPs. They aim to be easy to use and come in many types, some can interact
directly with the user’s PC (Yubikey), others are able to display the OTP on a display
(SecurID). Smart card based hardware tokens also exist but their computational power is
limited.
Hardware security tokens can be further divided into connected tokens, which have to
be connected to a host device in order to work (eg. Yubikey) and are able to interact with
the host without any additional interaction from the user, and unconnected tokens which
don’t have a means to be connected to a host. The unconnected tokens are often equipped
with a small screen from which the generated OTP can be read and has to be entered
manually into the authentication system.
2.1.2 Software Tokens
Compared to hardware tokens, software security tokens don’t use an often expensive
dedicated hardware token. They can be installed on a multi-purpose hardware that is
already available to the user such as a PC, PDA, laptop, tablet or a mobile phone. They
do not need batteries, they are more easily configured and are of course cheaper due to
the lack of having to buy dedicated hardware. On the other hand they are more prone to
threats and can be easily compromised by virus attacks.
2.2 Token Examples
As there is a huge number of different tokens and vendors only some of them can be
discussed in this thesis. The ones that are shown here however, are the most well-known
and used.
2.2.1 Yubikey
Yubikey [14] is a hardware token solution by the Yubico company and is most commonly
known for its lack of batteries (and the resulting longevity). The token communicates with
a PC station directly through a USB port and the OTP string is inserted as emulated
keystrokes and as such can be received by any type of input field or command prompt.
Figure 2.1: Yubico’s Yubikey OTP token. Taken from [13].
The token generates a counter-based OTP, the OTP string itself consists of a unique
public id and the actual one-time-password which can also be divided into a number of
fields:
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 Private ID – zeroes by default
 Usage counter – a counter that does not reset it’s value when the token is unplugged
from the host device. The counter increments every time a OTP is generated in a
new session.
 Session usage counter – a counter that is reset when the token is unplugged. Incre-
ments it’s value when the OTP is generated during the same session.
 Time-stamp – adds entropy to the generated OTP. Can also be used to determine
the time elapsed between two OTPs.
 Random number – adds more entropy to the OTP.
 Checksum – A 16-bit ISO13239 1st complement checksum.
The OTP is then encrypted using a 128-bit AES key and sent to the host device [13].
2.2.2 SecurID
The SecurID[3] token solution consists of a number of varying types of both software and
hardware tokens – security thumb sticks, smart cards, mobile and desktop software tokens.
hese tokens use symmetric cryptography and generate time-based OTPs every 60 seconds
(for the SecurID 700).
RSA also makes tokens that combine the time-driven and counter-driven OTP design.
Figure 2.2: RSA’s SecurID 700 OTP token. 1
2.2.3 Gemalto
Gemalto [5] security token solution consists of a number of different security tokens, some
of which can be used as compact smart card readers and as such can be a more economical
solution than other hardware security tokens. However, as this thesis concerns itself with
OTP tokens, only the IDProve 100 security token will be discussed further. This token is
an unconnected OATH certified[10] OTP token which can be used either in TOTP or in
HOTP mode and as such is able to be natively provisioned by the use of a PSKC document.
1Taken from http://www.tokenguard.com/RSA-SecurID-SID700.asp
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Figure 2.3: Gemalto’s IDProve 100 token. Taken from [5].
2.2.4 Verisign
Verisign (now part of Symantec) [2] is one of the most well known vendors offering a
software-based OTP security token solution. This solution makes use of a piece of hardware
that in recent years has seen massive deployment among the users – the smart phone.
Verisign’s Validation and ID Protection service (VIP) can be used on a variety of mobile
phones including Android, Blackberry and Windows Phone, is free of charge and can be
used with most major retailers including ebay and PayPal as a second layer of account
protection. This software solution uses time-based OTP generation as the OTP changes
every few seconds. Verisign also offers the same solution for desktop computers running
Windows and Mac.
Figure 2.4: Verisign’s software token solution running on an Android phone. Taken from
[2].
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2.3 Interopability
Since there is a wide variety of token types and vendors available, each with it’s own
protocol and algorithm, the interopability between them is nearly nonexistent. The PSKC
standard tries to fix this, however as there currently is no application that would be able
to take advantage of the standardized format PSKC provides the token vendors still has to
provide their own provisioning software for their client.
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Chapter 3
Portable Symmetric Key Container
This chapter provides insight into the PSKC standard, the document’s structure and se-
mantics. The chapter’s contents are based on RFC6030[7].
3.1 Overview
The Portable Symmetric Key Container (PSKC) is a standardized XML-based con-
tainer that can be used to transport symmetric keys and data related to the key or the
device on which it is used. The XML schema of the document will not be discussed here
and can be found in RFC6030.[7]
3.2 Structure
The top-level element of the document is the <KeyContainer> which can hold any number of
<KeyPackage> elements. It is also used to provide a means of encryption for the secret key.
Information about the encryption itself is stored in the <EncryptionKey> child element. It
also has two attributes, Id for identification purposes and Version which defines the version
of the schema used.
The <KeyPackage> element is the basic element of the document since it carries in-
formation about the key in a single <Key> child element and meta-data for the key in
<DeviceInfo> and <CryptoModuleInfo> child elements.
3.2.1 Key
The <Key> has at two mandatory attributes: a key identifier called Id and an algorithm
identifier called algorithm.
In code 3.1 you can see the PSKC document in it’s most essential form with the key
element’s mandatory attributes set. The standart also defines a number of optional child
elements for the <Key> element:
 <FriendlyName> contains a human-readable name for the key. Only for informational
purposes.
 <Issuer> is an element that provides information about the association that provided
the key/token.
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1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
2 <KeyContainer Version="1.0"
3 Id="example">
4 <KeyPackage>
5 <Key Id="12345678"
6 Algorithm="example">
7 <Data>
8 <Secret>
9 <PlainValue>MTIzNA==
10 </PlainValue>
11 </Secret>
12 </Data>
13 </Key>
14 </KeyPackage>
15 </KeyContainer>
Code 3.1: A Basic PSKC document
 The <AlgorithmParameters> element may contain various child elements. However
in this case we are only interested in the <ResponseFormat> element as it is the only
child that is used in OTP documents. The element defines the Encoding and Length
of the OTP (mandatory if <AlgorithmParameters> is used) and the <CheckDigit>
element which states whether the device needs to append a Luhn check digit.
 <UserId> is an element that contains a distinguished name of the user that uses this
key.
 The <Policy> has a number of child elements that define the usage of the key, PIN
protection (if any) and validity period of the key by the use of start end expiry dates.
 And finally the key’s data in a <Data> element. The data element itself has several
other child elements that vary depending on the token’s type:
All: The <Secret> element carries the secret key and is encoded using base64 en-
coding.
HOTP: <Counter> represents the token’s counter used in hash-based and counter-
based OTP tokens.
TOTP: The elements <Time>, <TimeInterval> and <TimeDrift> each carry a value
used by time-based OTP tokens1.
All of Data’s child elements can either be in plain text, or be encrypted using an
encryption key defined in the <KeyContainer> element.2
For an example showing the <Key> element, see code 3.2.
1Only the value of <TimeInterval> is used by the application
2Although the actual implementation only allows for the secret key to be encrypted.
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1 <Key Id="12345678"
2 Algorithm="example">
3 <Issuer>Issuer</Issuer>
4 <FriendlyName>I-am-friendly</FriendlyName>
5 <AlgorithmParameters>
6 <ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
7 </AlgorithmParameters>
8 <Policy>
9 <PINPolicy MinLength="4" MaxLength="4"
10 PINKeyId="123456781" PINEncoding="DECIMAL"
11 PINUsageMode="Local"/>
12 <KeyUsage>OTP</KeyUsage>
13 <StartDate>2009-01-22T00:25:11Z</StartDate>
14 <ExpiryDate>2010-01-22T00:25:11Z</ExpiryDate>
15 </Policy>
16 <Data>
17 <Secret>
18 <PlainValue>MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTA=
19 </PlainValue>
20 </Secret>
21 <Counter>
22 <PlainValue>0</PlainValue>
23 </Counter>
24 <TimeInterval>
25 <PlainValue>30</PlainValue>
26 </TimeInterval>
27 </Data>
28 <UserId>UID=kubat,DC=example,DC=net</UserId>
29 </Key>
Code 3.2: <Key> contents
3.2.2 DeviceInfo and CryptoModuleInfo
The <DeviceInfo> element contains child elements with various information about the
device that are used to identify the device:
 <Manufacturer> carries a string value which indicates the manufacturer of the device.
The value itself must be either an OATH manufacturer prefix or from the IANA
Number Registry.
 <SerialNo> element holds the serial number of the device.
 <IssueNo> contains the issue number of the device. In case there are two or more
devices with the same serial number they can be differentiated from each other by
the use of an issue number.
 <Model> indicates the model of the device.
 <StartDate> and <ExpiryDate> elements are used to hold start and expiry dates of
the device.
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The <CryptoModuleInfo> simply contains an <Id> element that uniquely identifies the
cryptographic module to which the key was provisioned. The structure of <DeviceInfo>
and <CryptoModuleInfo> can be seen in code 3.3
1 <DeviceInfo>
2 <Manufacturer>oath.UB</Manufacturer>
3 <SerialNo>123456789</SerialNo>
4 <UserId>CN=name,DC=example,DC=net</UserId>
5 <Model>model</Model>
6 <IssueNo>3</IssueNo>
7 <DeviceBinding>something</DeviceBinding>
8 <StartDate>2009-01-22T00:25:11Z</StartDate>
9 <ExpiryDate>2010-01-22T00:25:11Z</ExpiryDate>
10 </DeviceInfo>
11 <CryptoModuleInfo>
12 <Id>CM01</Id>
13 </CryptoModuleInfo>
Code 3.3: <DeviceInfo> and <CryptoModuleInfo> structure
3.2.3 Encryption
As stated before the PSKC standart allows for a number of elements in the document to
be encrypted using various encryption techniques. The encryption details themselves are
stored in a <EncryptionKey> element (a child of <KeyContainer>) and are limited to:
 Based on pre-shared keys – The <EncryptionKey> is filled with a string value of
”
Pre-shared-key“ and the encryption algorithm is specified in the encrypted data
elements.
 Using using passphrase-based key derivation (PBKDF2).3 In this case the <DerivedKey>
element states the derivation algorithm.
 Encryption using asymmetric keys. The certificate used in the algorithm must be
located inside the <EncryptionKey> element.
When using algorithms without any integrity checks, a MAC value must be placed inside
a <MACMethod> element in the <KeyContainer> element.
Regardless of the encryption used the encryption algorithm has to be specified in the
encrypted data elements.
For an example of the encryption structure used in a PSKC document see code 3.4. For
space reasons only a pre-shared key is shown, you can find other encryption structures in
RFC6030 [7].
3.2.4 Extensions
The PSKC standard also allows the vendors to extend the document by defining a different
semantics of some elements and an <Extensions> element can be used to define a new struc-
ture where the XML schema allows. The <Extensions> can be used as a child element of
3For more information about PBKDF2 see http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2124
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1 <EncryptionKey>
2 <ds:KeyName>Pre-shared-key</ds:KeyName>
3 </EncryptionKey>
4 <MACMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1">
5 <MACKey>
6 <xenc:EncryptionMethod
7 Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"/>
8 <xenc:CipherData>
9 <xenc:CipherValue>
10 ESIzRFVmd4iZABEiM0RVZgKn6WjLaTC1sbeBMSvIhRejN9vJa2BOlSaMrR7I5wSX
11 </xenc:CipherValue>
12 </xenc:CipherData>
13 </MACKey>
14 </MACMethod>
15 ...
16 <Data>
17 <Secret>
18 <EncryptedValue>
19 <xenc:EncryptionMethod
20 Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"/>
21 <xenc:CipherData>
22 <xenc:CipherValue>
23 AAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0OD+cIHItlB3Wra1DUpxVvOx2lef1VmNPCMl8jwZqIUqGv
24 </xenc:CipherValue>
25 </xenc:CipherData>
26 </EncryptedValue>
27 <ValueMAC>Su+NvtQfmvfJzF6bmQiJqoLRExc=
28 </ValueMAC>
29 </Secret>
30 </Data>
Code 3.4: PSKC structures used for encryption of data elements. Taken from RFC6030[7].
KeyContainer, Key, DeviceInfo, CryptoModuleInfo, KeyPackage and AlgorithmParameters
elements.
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Chapter 4
LDAP
The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is a protocol used for accessing a
information stored on one or more servers called directory servers. These servers keep
their data a hierarchical structure format called Directory Information Tree (DIT), each
part of the this DIT tree is an object called entry. An entry consists of a number of
attributes and is identified by a Relative Distinguished Name (RDN) which is an unique
attribute that differentiates it from its siblings. In terms of the whole tree it is identified by
a Distinguished Name (DN), which consists of its own RDN concatenated with its parent’s
DN effectively making it a description of the path it takes to get to a specific entry in the
DIT. For example the distinguished name cn=John,dc=example,dc=net would point to a
record, that is identified by a common name (cn) attribute with a string value of
”
John“
and would be a child of a dc=example,dc=net record.
Figure 4.1: LDAP Directory Information Tree. Taken from [1].
The LDIF format is a format used for carrying or modifying directory entries. As you
can see from code 4.1, a LDIF file consists of a number of pairs of attribute names and
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attribute values in a
”
attributeName : attributeValue“ format. For an example of a
directory server entry in LDIF format, see code 4.1.
1 dn: cn=Barbara Jensen, ou=Product Development, dc=airius, dc=com
2 objectclass: top
3 objectclass: person
4 objectclass: organizationalPerson
5 cn: Barbara Jensen
6 cn: Barbara J Jensen
7 cn: Babs Jensen
8 sn: Jensen
9 uid: bjensen
10 telephonenumber: +1 408 555 1212
11 description: A big sailing fan.
Code 4.1: A simple LDAP entry in LDIF format. Taken from RFC2849[6].
Each entry in the DIT has to have one or more objectClass attributes, which define the
syntax of the entries attributes. The objectclasses themselves are defined using an LDAP
schema.
4.1 Schema
An LDAP schema is a file that defines the syntactic rules for object classes used in DIT
entries. It consists of a number of fields – First a unique OID number value has to be
chosen for the object class and a unique name, which will be used in DIT entries using the
NAME field. An object class can have a superior (parent) class, which is defined using
the field SUP, this mechanism is a means of inheritance for the class. The resulting object
class can be one of three types – ABSTRACT, AUXILIARY and STRUCTURAL.
ABSTRACT classes are not used in DIT entries. These classes are only used to define
common attributes to its subclasses.
AUXILIARY classes are extending classes. They are used to extend an STRUCTURAL
class in a DIT entry but they cannot form DIT entries on their own.
STRUCTURAL class is the most common type as these take up a major part of DIT
entries. They can form entries on their own or in combination with an AUXILIARY.
However, there cannot be more than one STRUCTURAL object class in a single DIT
entry if those STRUCTURAL classes are not related to each other (one is a subclass
of the other).
Following the object type the schema can describe the token in a human-friendly way using
the DESC field. The actual syntactic definitions are contained in MAY and MUST fields,
they define which attributes may and must be present in a DIT entry respectively. Lastly
the schema can also provide a human-friendly description X-ORIGIN of the origin project
of the schema. A schema that defines a basic record for security tokens can be found in
code 4.2.
You can see that the record which the schema defines must have a ipatokenUniqueID
attribute serving as an identifier for the record and may have a number of other attributes
such as the token’s owner or an attribute that designates the vendor of the token.
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1 objectclasses: ( 2.16.840.1.113730.3.8.17.1 NAME ’ipaToken’ SUP top ABSTRACT
2 DESC ’Abstract token class for tokens’
3 MUST ( ipatokenUniqueID )
4 MAY ( description $ ipatokenOwner $ ipatokenDisabled $
ipatokenNotBefore $
5 ipatokenNotAfter $ ipatokenVendor $ ipatokenModel
$ ipatokenSerial $ ipatokenLostNotAfter)
6 X-ORIGIN ’FreeIPA’ )
Code 4.2: An example LDAP schema for a security token. Taken from [4].
The attributes used in object class definitions also have to be defined in an LDAP
schema using a different set of fields. The definition of an attribute can be seen in code 4.3.
1 attributetypes: ( 2.16.840.1.113730.3.8.16.1 NAME ’ipatokenUniqueID’
2 DESC ’Token Unique Identifier’
3 EQUALITY caseIgnoreMatch
4 SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.15
5 SINGLE-VALUE
6 X-ORIGIN ’FreeIPA’ )
Code 4.3: An example LDAP schema for an attribute type definition. Taken from [4].
As you can see the schema defines an OID identifier for the attribute followed by
a unique human-friendly name, description of the attribute, an equality field which
designates, how it will behave in a search filter, and a syntax field carrying an OID value
which defines the data type of the attribute (in this instance a string).
4.2 Access Control
Most of the records are publicly available to be read. However, this behavior is unacceptable
when working with secret keys as is the case in this thesis. This means that the access to the
secret data has to be managed by some mechanism. In an LDAP server this is achieved by
using ACIs (Access control instructions) [9]. These instructions can be added to a record
to define the user right’s for that record.
An access control instruction consists of four parts:
target: This part defines the target attributes to which the rights are applied to.
name: A human-friendly name for the ACI.
permissions: This part sets what the user can and cannot do with the record.
bind rule: The last part defines which users are affected by the rule – ldap:///anyone
”
for anyone, “ldap:///all
”
for authenticated users, a dn of a group, etc.
An example of a ACI used in the actual application can be found in code 4.4. This ACI
denies access to the secret key for all authenticated users.
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1 aci : (targetattr ="ipatokenOTPkey")(version 3.0;acl "Deny access to secret
key.";deny (all)(userdn = "ldap:///all");)
Code 4.4: An ACI to deny access to a secret key attribute.
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Chapter 5
Application Design
This section describes the initial design aims as well as the design decisions behind the
application.
The design of the application can be split into three main sections – the design of the
PSKC parser, the design of the modular interface and the design of the LDAP plugin. The
aim of the designing phase was to design a highly modular parser back-end which could
be used with different kinds of output modules that would be able to transform the input
PSKC document into a more usable format to use in a identity management system (such
as Red Hat’s FreeIPA or Microsoft’s Active Directory).
For this goal to be accomplished the back-end must be entirely independent from the
module front-end but at the same time has to be friendly to the user of the application.
As a proof of concept for the modular interface of the application, an LDAP plugin which
is able to upload key information into a 389DS directory server (a part of the FreeIPA
solution) has been designed (and developed).
The figure 5 shows the different parts of the application and the relationships between
them.
Figure 5.1: Application structure
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5.1 Parser Design
As the PSKC document allows for vendor-specific extensions and semantic changes to the
original schema the main aim of the parser design was to solve this problem. For this reason
the parser had to be split into three parts:
 The Base module which would take care of commandline arguments, filters and
parsing those parts of the code that could not be extended by any means.
The base module is able to search the input document for <KeyPackage> structures
that meet the filter conditions, differentiate between different document types de-
pending on which algorithm the token uses and is able to hand the document over to
a parser extension, that is suitable for parsing that particular piece of code. It also
takes care of the communication between the parser and the output plugins of the
application.
 The Default parser which would be able to parse the unextended PSKC document
as described by RFC6030 [7].
The functionality of the parser is split into a number of parts (a part that parser the
<Key> element, a part for the <DeviceInfo> element, etc.) so that the parser exten-
sion can easily modify the default behavior by adding extended rules or validation to
specific elements.
 The Parser extensions that are able to parse extensions of a specific vendor. These
parser extensions are used in combination with the default parser to parse and validate
an extended PSKC document. The following vendor extension will be implemented:
Yubikey[11], OAUTH HOTP [7] and TOTP [8], RSA SecurID[8].
5.2 Modular interface
The modular interface is a fundamental part of the application and this thesis.
For the demands on the application to be satisfied the application’s design needed to
be highly modular, meaning the functionality of the parser and the plugins had to be
entirely independent from each other.
It has been accomplished using a simple interface where the parser back-end would
process the user’s choice of plugin, parse the PSKC document as normal and then (based
on the user’s choice) would run the specified plugin. This process is fully automated
and the only thing the user has to do when installing a new plugin is to put it into the
right folder a remember its name to be able to run if afterwards. This design makes the
application intuitive and easy to use.
5.3 Plugin Design
This section contains the design of the proof-of-concept plugin for the back-end that would
be able to upload parsed data into an LDAP directory server. The main part of designing
the LDAP plugin was to design a suitable LDAP schema definition of a record in which the
parsed data could be stored in.
The design of the LDAP schema is based on an already existing schema used in the
FreeIPA identity management system. However, as that schema is only compatible with
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TOTP tokens some minor adjustments had to be made. An additional attribute in which
the counter is stored1 and more classes for the three types of tokens the original scheme
did not attend to (counter; counter+time; neither counter, nor time). In the new schema
HOTP’s counter value can be stored in an ipatokenHOTPcounter attribute while the time
interval value is stored in the ipatokenTOTPtimeStep attribute from the original FreeIPA
schema.
The resulting schema can be seen in code 5.1 and 5.2. This schema extends the original
FreeIPA security token schema [4] and all the new classes inherit additional attributes from
the ipaToken abstract class which could be seen in code 4.2. Attributes added to each
object class compared to the abstract class are as follows:
ipatokenOTPkey contains the secret key used for OTP generation. This is the only field
that is affected by access rights as this key is not allowed to be read for security
reasons. More on the actual implementation in section 6.3.
ipatokenOTPalgorithm contains the unique identifier of the algorithm used in OTP
generation.
ipatokenOTPdigits field describes the length of the OTP.
ipatokenTOTPtimeStep describes the interval after which the OTP generated by time-
based OTPs changes.
As you can see three additional object classes had been added to the original FreeIPA
schema each with attributes for the corresponding token type (HOTP, hash + time, neither
of both). Additionally the TOTP token object class schema has been changed slightly as
the original one did not inherit from the ipaToken abstract class probably due to a naming
issue. This may be resolved by the FreeIPA team in the future and if so additional slight
changes in the naming style of the object classes might be necessary.
1 attributetypes: ( 2.16.840.1.113730.3.8.16.15 NAME ’ipatokenHOTPcounter’
2 DESC ’HOTP Counter’
3 EQUALITY integerMatch
4 SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27
5 SINGLE-VALUE
6 X-ORIGIN ’FreeIPA’ )
Code 5.1: Counter attribute definition.
This also meant that the plugin had to be able to differenciate between the types of
tokens so that it may choose a class best suitable for the token (eg. time for TOTP, counter
for HOTP).
1As the directory server is a read oriented service it should be noted that this counter attribute is not
meant to be overwritten. It is merely an initial value of the counter.
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1 objectClasses: ( 2.16.840.1.113730.3.8.17.2 NAME ’ipatokenTOTP’ DESC ’TOTP
Token Type’ SUP ipaToken STRUCTURAL
2 MAY ( ipatokenOTPkey $ ipatokenOTPalgorithm $ ipatokenOTPdigits $
3 ipatokenOTPclockOffset $ ipatokenTOTPtimeStep)
4 X-ORIGIN ’FreeIPA’ )
5 objectClasses: ( 2.16.840.1.113730.3.8.17.3 NAME ’ipatokenHOTP’ DESC DESC
’HOTP Token Type’ SUP ipaToken STRUCTURAL
6 MAY ( ipatokenOTPkey $ ipatokenOTPalgorithm $ ipatokenOTPdigits $
7 ipatokenOTPclockOffset $ ipatokenTOTPtimeStep)
8 X-ORIGIN ’PSKCParser’ )
9 objectClasses: ( 2.16.840.1.113730.3.8.17.4 NAME ’ipatokenMixed’ DESC ’Mixed
token type’ SUP ipaToken STRUCTURAL
10 MAY ( ipatokenOTPkey $ ipatokenOTPalgorithm $ ipatokenOTPdigits
11 ipatokenOTPclockOffset $ ipatokenHOTPcounter $
ipatokenTOTPtimeStep)
12 X-ORIGIN ’PSKCParser’ )
13 objectClasses: ( 2.16.840.1.113730.3.8.17.4 NAME ’ipatokenOTP’ DESC ’OTP
Token Type’ SUP ipaToken STRUCTURAL
14 MAY ( ipatokenOTPkey $ ipatokenOTPalgorithm $ ipatokenOTPdigits
15 ipatokenOTPclockOffset)
16 X-ORIGIN ’PSKCParser’ )
Code 5.2: An LDAP schema for additional types of tokens.
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Chapter 6
Implementation
This chapter describes the implementation of the designed application. The application has
been implemented in the Python 2.7 programming language and uses the ElementTree
library from Python’s Standard Library for input XML processing and a third party library
called python-ldap[12] (which is also used in the FreeIPA project) for communication with
an LDAP server.
Like the design, the implementation can be divided into three main sections – imple-
mentation of the parser, the modular interface and the LDAP plugin.
6.1 PSKC Parser
This section details the implementation of the PSKC document parser which has been split
into three parts – the base module, default parser and parser extensions.
6.1.1 Base Module
The base module resides in the pskcparser.py module and is mainly used to communicate
with the parser and the chosen plugin. It takes care of the parser’s commandline argu-
ment parsing using the Standart argparse library and also takes care of parsing the initial
<KeyContainer> root element using the function parse keycontainer for encryption keys
(and MACs) and <KeyPackage> elements.
The module then proceeds to insert the information about encryption into a dictionary
called continfo and for each <KeyPackage> element finds the key generation algorithm
from the algorithm attribute of the package’s <Key> element. If there is no <Key> element
present in the package (or if the key does not have the mandatory Algorithm attribute)
the module just skips it entirely.
In case a known algorithm has been found the module calls the corresponding parser
extension and let’s it take care of the rest of the data. If the algorithm is unknown the
module calls the default PSKC parser to try to parse it that way.
Regardless of the algorithm after the document has been parsed the base module then
checks the user filter and applies it if needed to either leave or discard the data from the
parser. It then moves on to passing both the information about encryption and about the
key package to the chosen module.
An example that shows how the encryption information from code 3.4 (using a pre-
shared key) can be represented internally in the continfo dictionary is located in code
6.1.
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1 continfo {
2 'encryption' :'preshared',
3 'macalgorithm' :'http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1',
4 'encalgorithm' :'http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc',
5 'macvalue' :
'ESIzRFVmd4iZABEiM0RVZgKn6WjLaTC1sbeBMSvIhRejN9vJa2BOlSaMrR7I5wSX' }
Code 6.1: Internal representation of encryption information.
6.1.2 Default Parser
The default parser is defined by the KeyPack class inside default.py module and makes
heavy use of the etree Standart library, especially of the find method defined in the etree
Element class which is used to search for elements using their tag (namespace + name of
the element) that fit the search parameters.
The main method of the class is the parse method which takes an etree element
pointing to a <KeyPackage> element that needs to be parsed and serves as a junction for
the parser. Depending on which elements are present can call other methods to parse
<DeviceInfo>, <CryptoModuleInfo> and <Key> elements.
Parsing of the <CryptoModuleInfo> element is pretty straightforward as the unextended
element only contains a identifier of the crypto module which it then stores into the object’s
cryptoid attribute.
The <DeviceInfo> element is parsed using the parse DevInfo method and checks the
structure for various optional elements. The data parsed from those elements is then stored
into a devinfo dictionary attribute for further use in the output plugin.
The result of parsing the <DeviceInfo> element from code 3.3 into an internal repre-
sentation can be seen in code 6.2.
1 devinfo {
2 'Manufacturer' :'oath.UB',
3 'SerialNo' :'123456789',
4 'Model' :'model',
5 'IssueNo' :'3',
6 'DeviceBinding' :'something',
7 'StartDate' :'2009-01-22T00:25:11Z',
8 'ExpiryDate' :'2010-01-22T00:25:11Z',
9 'UserId' :'CN=name,DC=example,DC=net' }
Code 6.2: Internal representation of a <DeviceInfo> element.
Parsing of the <Key> element is a bit more complicated compared to previous two
elements as the structure can contain a number of element in various configurations.
First the method looks if there is a <AlgorithmParameters> and/or a <Policy> struc-
ture and calls the corresponding methods (either parse AlgParam or parse KeyPolicy).
When parsing the <AlgorithmParameters> structure the parser looks for a <ResponseFormat>
element as it is the only child element of <AlgorithmParameters> which can be present in
an OTP document and stores the parsed data into a dictionary attribute algattr.
The parse KeyPolicy method checks the <Policy> structure for a <KeyUsage> element
that designates the usage of the token. If it does not find an element that allows for the
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token to be used for OTP generation or if there is no <KeyUsage> inside the structure the
parser exits with an error state. Otherwise it stores additional information located in the
<Policy> structure into a policyinfo dictionary attribute while PIN policy attributes are
stored into a pinattr dictionary attribute
An internal representation of <AlgorithmParameters> and <Policy> elements from
code 3.2 can be found in code 6.3.
1 algattr {
2 'Length' :'8',
3 'Encoding' :'DECIMAL' }
4 policyinfo {
5 'Usage' :'OTP',
6 'IssueNo' :'3',
7 'StartDate' :'2009-01-22T00:25:11Z',
8 'ExpiryDate' :'2010-01-22T00:25:11Z' }
9 pinattr {
10 'MinLength' :'4',
11 'MaxLength' :'4',
12 'PINKeyId' :'123456781',
13 'PINEncoding' :'DECIMAL',
14 'PINUsageMode' :'Local' }
Code 6.3: Internal representation of <AlgorithmParameters> and <Policy> elements.
Next the method parses those child elements that carry key-related information (eg. the
issuer of the key or user’s ID) and stores this information into into a keyinfo dictionary
attribute. It also tries to find the <Extension> element and if available stores the extension
structure into an extelement attribute variable for additional parsing in a parser extension
The parser then proceeds with the <Data> structure. The <Data> structure consist of
several optional elements and each of these can be either encrypted or in plaintext and
when encrypted can be accompanied by a MAC tag in a <ValueMAC> element. However,
as I deemed the encryption of anything other than the secret key unnecessary, only the
<Key> can be encrypted for the parser to be able to parse the <Data> structure successfully.
When parsing the secret key structure, the parser checks if the <KeyContainer> has an
encryption key defined using a isencrypted boolean attribute which has been set by the
base module when initializing the object. If there is no encryption key and the secret key
is encrypted the method exits with an error status. The data element’s combination varies
depending on which type of token the document was generated from, eg. a HOTP token
will use a <Counter> element and not a <TimeInterval> element, and a TOTP token the
other way around.
Once the <Data> structure has been parsed the method stores the data into a keydata
dictionary attribute.
For an example of an internal representation of the <Data> structure and other key-
related carrying child elements from code 3.2 see code 6.4
The last method of the object is the print keys method. This method simply prints
information stored in the object’s attributes and can be used either for debugging or as a
means of communication with other software through the commandline.
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1 keyinfo {
2 'Id' :'12345678',
3 'Algorithm' :'example'
4 'Issuer' :'Issuer',
5 'FriendlyName' :'I-am-friendly'
6 'UserId' :'UID=kubat,DC=example,DC=net'
7 }
8 # Plain
9 keydata {
10 'Secret' :'MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTA=',
11 'SecretType' :'plain'
12 'Counter' :'0',
13 'TimeInterval' :'30'
14 }
15 # Encrypted
16 keydata {
17 'Secret' :
'AAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0OD+cIHItlB3Wra1DUpxVvOx2lef1VmNPCMl8jwZqIUqGv',
18 'SecretType' :'encrypted'
19 'MAC' :'LP6xMvjtypbfT9PdkJhBZ+D6O4w='
20 ... }
Code 6.4: Internal representation of key information of the <Key> element.
6.1.3 Parser Extensions
The parser extensions are defined by various classes inside the alhorithms.py module.
They are based on default parser’s KeyPack class and inherit all of its methods and at-
tributes. The extensions already implemented by the application can be mostly used to
validate documents from various types of tokens. However, it is just as easy to set up
the extension to be able to parse new sets of elements that are not defined by the original
RFC6030.
When developing an extension, the object’s attributes algparamreq and keypolicyreq
in the init method of the object can be set to True to indicate that the elements
<AlgorithmParameters> and/or <Policy> are mandatory for the parsed document instead
of being optional. Validation checks can be added by redefining the object’s parse method
and support for extensions can be added through redefining the particular parser method
where the extension occurs.
To actually use the class in the base module, the class object has to be added to the
alglist dictionary (also defined in alhorithms.py) with the algorithm identifier1 as a key
for the entry. The PskcError class can be used as a PSKCparser-specific exception.
An example showing a Yubikey parser extension can be seen in code 6.5. As you can see
the PSKC document generated by a Yubikey security token has to contain <AlgorithmParameters>
structure and also has some additional validity rules. For example the crypto device identi-
fier can only be designated by a number 1 or 2, as it indicates which key slot of the yubikey
the document is generated from (the yubikey only has two slots).
1This is the identifier that has to be present in the <Key> element as an Algorithm parameter.
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1 class Yubikey(KeyPack):
2 def __init__(self, encrypt):
3 KeyPack.__init__(self, encrypt)
4 # Algorithm Parameters required
5 self.algparamreq =True
6 def parse(self, element):
7 KeyPack.parse(self, element)
8 try:
9 # Attribute validation
10 if self.devinfo['Manufacturer'] !='oath.UB':
11 raise PskcError
12 if self.devinfo['StartDate'] is None:
13 raise PskcError
14 if self.cryptoid !='1' and self.cryptoid !='2':
15 raise PskcError
16 if (self.algattr['Encoding'] !='ALPHANUMERIC' or
17 'Length' not in self.algattr):
18 raise PskcError
19 except (PskcError, KeyError):
20 print ('Error! Key ' +self.keyinfo['Id'] +' is not a valid'
21 ' Yubico key.')
Code 6.5: Parser extension for the Yubikey token
6.2 Modular Interface
The modular interface is a set of mechanisms that implement the modular aspect of the
application.
6.2.1 Argument Processing
The first part of this interface is the commandline argument processing. As the
application is designed to be highly modular the argument parser for the plugins cannot be
located in the base module but in the plugin file itself. That makes argument parsing quite
tricky. The solution to this is to process commandline arguments in two iterations.
In the first iteration the argument parser only checks two arguments – help and mod-
ule. Depending on the combination of these two arguments the parser then chooses one of
following steps:
 Only the help argument is set – the argument parser prints the help for the back-end
parser and exits.
 Both the help and the module arguments are set – the application creates a new
parser, this time with information about both the back-end’s and the plugin’s argu-
ments, print the help and exits. How the parser gets the argument information from
the plugin will be discussed in the next part of this section.
 Only the module argument is set – this means that the user doesn’t want to print
the help of the application. Once again a new command line parser is formed with
information about both the back-end’s and the plugin’s arguments, the arguments
are parsed again and the back-end continues on to PSKC document parsing.
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 Neither of those arguments are set – this results in an error state and the argument
parser exists immediately.
6.2.2 Dynamic Import
Next part of the interface is the actual importing of the code from the plugin. As the
plugin is not known beforehand it has to be imported dynamically. This is accomplished
using the Standard library importlib and its import module function which makes it
possible to import a module using a string value with its name (which is provided by the
argument parser’s first iteration) and save the resulting module object into a variable, in
this case the variable is called mod.
The name of the plugin (without its file extension) can be found in the args.module
attribute of the argparse object once its first iteration has been completed. The function
also needs to know from where the plugin is to be implemented. In this case a modules
package has been used. After this is done imported plugin’s functions can be simply called
through the mod object as though as its method would be called.
The code that takes care of the dynamic import and an example of using the module
object can be found in code 6.6.
1 # Import the chosen plugin from the modules package
2 try:
3 mod =importlib.import_module('.' +args.module, 'modules')
4 except ImportError as msg:
5 print 'Import error: ', msg
6 ...
7 # Add the plugin's arguments
8 parser =mod.add_args(parser)
9 ...
10 # After parsing every key, run the chosen module
11 mod.run(continfo, keylist, args)
Code 6.6: Dynamic import of modules and its use
6.2.3 Plugin Interface
The last part is the interface of the plugin itself. It is used to simplify the communication
between the base module and the parser. The plugin’s interface consists of two functions –
add args() and run() and the plugin has to implement both of these functions to be able
to communicate with the base module without problems.
The add args() function is a function that takes care of the plugin’s argument definition
using an argparse object which is passed as an argument to the function. Once the plugin’s
argument options are added the function returns the parser object to the base module.
the function run() takes care of the plugin’s functionality. The plugin’s code has to be
present in this function or defined in other function and called by the run() function for
the application to work. The run() function takes three arguments:
continfo which is a dictionary containing encryption data of the PSKC document,
keylist is a list of KeyPack objects (or a list of extensions), and args which is the argparse
argument parser object. If an error is encountered in in the run() function the function
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should return with an exit status (an integer value other than 0), otherwise it returns the
value 0.
6.3 LDAP Plugin
The implementation of the plugin is located in the ldapm.py module inside the modules
package and uses the third party library python-ldap.
In the add args() function the plugin defines several arguments for the argument parser
which were modeled after arguments of the ldapmodify shell interface for LDAP library
calls. By doing this the plugin aims to be easy to use for users which already have some
experience with LDAP directory modification.
-H host: This argument specifies the URI of the LDAP server to which the plugin will
try to connect to. The URI has to be in the format protocol:host:port, for example
ldap://example.com:389.
-D dn: The argument specified by this option is used as a distinguished name when binding
to the LDAP server.
-r root: The root argument specifies the distinguished name of the node to which the new
entries should be added.
-w passwd: The plugin will use the string passwd as a password when binding to the LDAP
server.
-W: This switch will activate a password prompt. It can be used instead of the -w option
if needed. However, these two arguments can never be used both at once.
-a: This option will add an ACI which to deny all users to read, write and modify the
secret key to the LDAP record.
The run() function uses the python-ldap library to simplify the communication with
a LDAP server. However, before anything else, the plugin checks whether there actually
is any data to be uploaded to the server. After that it tries to initialize a connection with
the chosen LDAP server using python-ldap’s function initialize function. This function
returns an LDAPObject object if a connection has been established successfully. Using the
LDAPObject the plugin tries to bind to the server with arguments provided through the
commandline as the distinguished name and the password. The object’s method which is
used for this operation is called simple bind s. The plugin then proceeds with transforming
the data in the internal representation of the back-end into a more useful format.
The first part of this transformation has to convert the internal representation into a
format used by the python-ldap library which emulates the LDIF format used by LDAP.
The basic structure of this format is a list of (attributeType, attributeValue) tuples.
If the attributeType is able to contain multiple values, the attributeValue can contain a list
of values instead of a single value.
From the the data provided by the KeyPack object only the following are used and
transformed into the new format (if available): Manufacturer, Model, SerialNo from the
dictionary devinfo, Id, Algorithm, UserId from keyinfo, Length from algattr and Secret
from the from keydata dictionary. Additionally the plugin checks the type of the token
depending on the combination of keydata entries, chooses the suitable objectClass from the
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LDAP schema and stores the Counter and/or TimeInterval from the keydata dictionary.
However only the identifier of the key is mandatory in the used LDAP schema and the
PSKC standard only adds the algorithm identifier, which makes the rest of the attributes
optional.
After the key data is transformed into python-ldap’s internal format the plugin adds
an access control instruction attribute that makes sure the secret key ipatokenOTPkey
can only be accessed and modified by the administrator of the directory server. The ACI
instruction can be seen in code 4.4 in the LDIF format. However, this behavior can be
suppressed by not using the commandline option -a which the user is advised to do and
define more appropriate access rights for the data.
An example showing the python-ldap’s data format for an HOTP token can be seen in
code 6.7. At first look the format really resembles the LDIF format.
1 record [
2 ('objectclass', ['ipaToken', 'ipaTokenHOTP']),
3 ('ipatokenVendor', 'Manufacturer'),
4 ('ipatokenModel', 'one-button-HOTP-token-V1'),
5 ('ipatokenSerial','987654321'),
6 ('ipatokenUniqueID','12345678'),
7 ('ipatokenOTPalgorithm','urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc:hotp'),
8 ('ipatokenOwner','UID=kubat,DC=example,DC=net'),
9 ('ipatokenOTPkey','MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTA='),
10 ('ipatokenHOTPcounter','0')
11 ]
Code 6.7: Data representation for the python-ldap library.
After completing the transformation into a list of tuples the plugin calls LDAPObject’s
method add s which transforms the list of tuples into an actual LDIF file and uploads the
new entry to the server. As an identifier in the new entry’s distinguished name the identifier
of the key will be used (ipatokenUniqueID).
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
The aim of this thesis was to design an implement a modular parser for XML documents
describing one-time-passwords and a plugin able to store the parsed data into an LDAP
database. In the first few chapters the thesis introduced the theory behind it, acquainted the
reader with one-time-passwords, security tokens in general and with some specific tokens
with which the resulting application is compatible. It also provided an introduction to
the PSKC standard and its structure and into the LDAP protocol, both of which were
important for the design phase of the thesis.
The second part consists of the design of the back-end parser, the modular interface and
the LDAP plugin which was then implemented using Python 2.7 and a number of libraries.
The task was successfully completed as the application meets the criteria established
by the technical specification. The application was designed to be simple to use and at
the same time highly-modular. However, as many token vendors I tried to contact did not
respond (probably due to the fact, that the PSKC standard is not that known) the resulting
application is only compatible with Yubico’s Yubikey, OATH-compatible security tokens
and security tokens that don’t make any changes to the XML document. An extension
for RSA’s SecurID has also been implemented. However, as the source algorithm profile
is outdated and no newer version is available, the functionality of the implementation is
uncertain.
The application has been tested using document examples from RFC6030 [7], Yubikey
PSKC public profile [11] and modified examples used in PSKC profile draft [8].
7.1 Future development
The possibilities for future development lie mainly in developing new plugins that may be
used with the application back-end (eg. SQL).
It has also been noted that using the Counter attribute of hash and counter-based tokens
in an LDAP server is not exactly a good idea as the system is read-oriented and the counter
attribute changes often. This problem will need to be solved before these types of tokens
can be used with an LDAP-based identity management system effectively, probably using
a database system for storing counters.
Lastly the application can be extended further by developing parser extensions for tokens
that will start using the PSKC standard in the future.
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Appendix A
CD Contents
Directory Contents
source/ Source code of the aplication
source/modules A package containing plugins for the application
source/samples PSKC document examples
source/tests Basic automated tests for the parser
lib/ Third party libraries used by the application
tex/ Source code of this thesis in LATEX.
tex/fig/ Figures used in this thesis
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